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Abstract
This paper investigates mixed strategies in dynamic games with perfect
information. We present an example to show that a player may obtain higher payoff
by playing mixed strategy. By contrast, the main result of the paper shows that
every two-player zero-sum game with nature has the no-mixing property, which
implies that mixed strategy is useless in this most classical class of games. As for
applications, we show the existence of pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria in
two-player zero-sum games with nature. Based on the main result, we also prove
the existence of a universal subgame-perfect equilibrium that can induce all the
pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria in such games. A generalization of the
main result for multiple players and some further results are also discussed.
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2
1 Introduction
The notion of mixed strategy has been widely used in game theory and economics.
Compared with pure strategies, there are several advantages for adopting mixed
strategies. For example, the famous result of Nash shows that a mixed-strategy
equilibrium exists in a normal form game with finitely many actions, while such an
existence result may fail if one focuses on pure strategies.1 For another example, we
construct a very simple dynamic game in Section 3, where players move sequentially
and the first mover is able to get a strictly higher payoff by adopting mixed
strategies. The third example is the consumer search model that typically works
with the price dispersion, meaning that sellers follow a mixed pricing strategy even
though they sell the homogeneous product.
The observations above suggest that mixed strategies could matter in many
game theoretical environments. However, the notion of mixed strategy is often
criticized for its limited appeal in practical situations. It could be reasonable to
argue that people rarely adopt mixed strategies when making decisions. In this
paper, we study an important and widely adopted class of dynamic games, and
prove the no-mixing property. To be precise, we focus on dynamic zero-sum games
with sequential moves, and show that given any mixed-strategy subgame-perfect
equilibrium, an arbitrary combination of actions taken from the equilibrium path
is a pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium delivering the same equilibrium
payoffs.
In order to prove the no-mixing property, we show that when a player faces
multiple optimal choices at some stage, she can choose any optimal choice rather
than using a mixed strategy at that stage. It turns out that this local optimal
choice (optimal at one stage) is also globally optimal (as part of a subgame-perfect
equilibrium path). This novel result suggests that focusing on pure strategies is
without loss in dynamic zero-sum games, as nothing can be gained by adopting
the possibly more complicated mixed strategies.
The no-mixing property has important implications. In a dynamic game, if
players are assumed to adopt mixed strategies, then it means not only that every
player has the access to her own randomization device, but also that the outcome of
such a randomization device is objectively verifiable by other players in subsequent
subgames. The no-mixing property irons out the conceptual difficulties associated
with mixed strategies.2
Our paper is closely related to the literature on dynamic game with perfect
1For example, the only Nash equilibrium in a matching pennies game is that each player chooses
each action with equal probability, which is a mixed-strategy equilibrium.
2See Section 3.2 in Osborne and Rubinstein (1994) for extensive discussions of the conceptual
difficulties associated with mixed strategies.
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information, which mainly focuses on the pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilib-
rium. It is obvious that in every finite dynamic game with perfect information, a
pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium exists by using the backward induction
analysis. This existence result can be extended to the setting of perfect-information
dynamic games with general action spaces and without Nature; see, for example,
Bo¨rgers (1989, 1991), Harris (1985), Hellwig and Leininger (1987), and Hellwig
et al. (1990). However, the pure-strategy equilibrium existence result may fail
once Nature is present. Harris, Reny and Robson (1995) constructed a four-
stage dynamic game with perfect information. In that game, Nature moves
in the third stage and the game does not possess any pure-strategy subgame-
perfect equilibrium, while a mixed-strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium does exist.
Besides the possible nonexistence of pure-strategy equilibrium, as mentioned in the
beginning, we construct a dynamic game with perfect information in Section 3,
where the first mover can get a strictly higher payoff by playing a mixed strategy.
Thus, mixed strategies do matter in dynamic games with perfect information, in
terms of both the equilibrium existence and the achievable equilibrium payoff set.
In contrast, our result implies that focusing on pure strategies in dynamic zero-sum
games is not restrictive in itself, which provides a possible justification for the wide
usage of pure strategies in such games.3
Our main result has interesting applications. First, in the setting of dynamic
zero-sum games with perfect information, we generalize the existence result of
pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium from He and Sun (2019). Instead of
imposing the atomless transitions condition as in He and Sun (2019), we put no
restrictions on the state transitions. Second, we propose the notion of universal
subgame-perfect equilibrium in the sense that its realizations are all the possible
pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria. Relying on the no-mixing property, it
is straightforward to show that a universal subgame-perfect equilibrium exists.
We also provide an improved backward induction algorithm, which is useful for
identifying universal subgame-perfect equilibria in finite-horizon dynamic games
with perfect information.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the
model of dynamic games with perfect information, and define the notion of (weak)
no-mixing property. In Section 3, a simple example of dynamic game with perfect
information is presented, in which some player can get a strictly higher payoff by
playing a mixed strategy. Section 4 proves the no-mixing property and discusses
the applications. In Section 5, we extend our main result to multi-player dynamic
games. Section 6 provides some further discussions about the no-mixing property.
3For more discussions, see Zermelo (1913), Schwalbe and Walker (2001), and Ewerhart (2000, 2002).
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2 Model
2.1 Continuous dynamic games
In this section, we shall present the model for a general continuous perfect
information dynamic game with Nature.
The set of players is I0 = {0, 1, . . . , n}, where the players in I = {1, . . . , n}
are active and player 0 is the Nature. Time is discrete, and can be indexed by
t = 0, 1, 2, . . ..
A product space H0 = X0 × S0 is the set of starting points, where X0 is a
compact metric space and S0 is a Polish space (i.e., a complete separable metric
space).4
In this paper, we focus on dynamic games with perfect information. In such
games, all the players (including Nature) move sequentially and there is only one
mover in each stage (this mover depends on history). At stage t ≥ 1, if Nature is
the only mover, then Nature’s action is chosen from a Polish space St, and other
player i’s action are a single point of a Polish space Xti; if active player i is the
only mover, then player i’s action is chosen from a subset of the Polish space Xti,
and other player j’s action are a single point of the Polish space Xtj , and Nature’s
action is a single point of the Polish space St. We denote Xt =
∏
i∈I Xti. Let
Xt =
∏
0≤k≤tXk and S
t =
∏
0≤k≤t Sk. The Borel σ-algebras on Xt and St are
denoted by B(Xt) and B(St), respectively. For any t ≥ 0, a history up to the
stage t is a vector5
ht = (x0, s0, x1, s1, . . . , xt, st) ∈ Xt × St.
The set of all such possible histories is denoted by Ht and Ht ⊆ Xt × St.
Now we consider the Nature’s behavior. For any t ≥ 1, Nature’s action is
given by ft0, which is a continuous mapping from Ht−1 toM(St),6 that is, for any
bounded continuous function ψ on St, the integral∫
St
ψ(st)ft0(dst|ht−1)
is continuous in ht−1.
4Here we follow notations in He and Sun (2019). In each stage t ≥ 1, there will be a set of action
profiles Xt and a set of states St. Without loss of generality, we assume that the set of initial points is
also a product space.
5By abusing the notation, we also view ht = (x0, s0, x1, s1, . . . , xt, st) as the vector
(x0, x1, . . . , xt, s0, s1, . . . , st) in X
t × St.
6M(St) denotes the set of all Borel probability measures on St and is endowed with the topology of
weak convergence.
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For any t ≥ 1 and i ∈ I, let Ati be a continuous compact valued correspondence7
from Ht−1 to Xti such that Ati(ht−1) is the set of available actions for player i ∈ I
given the history ht−1 ∈ Ht−1, and let At =
∏
i∈I Ati. In each stage t, if an action
correspondence Ati is not point valued for some player i ∈ I, then Atj is point
valued for any j 6= i, j ∈ I, and ft0(ht−1) ≡ δst for some st ∈ St. That is, only
player i is active in stage t, while all the other players are inactive. If the state
transition ft0 does not put probability 1 on some point, then Ati must be point
valued for any i ∈ I. That is, only Nature can move in stage t, while all the players
i ∈ I are inactive. The set of all possible histories Ht = Gr(At)×St, where Gr(At)
is the graph of At.
In an infinite-horizon game, for any x = (x0, x1, . . .) ∈ X∞, let xt =
(x0, . . . , xt) ∈ Xt be the truncation of x up to stage t. Truncations for s ∈ S∞ can
be defined similarly. Let H∞ be the subset of X∞ × S∞ such that (x, s) ∈ H∞
if (xt, st) ∈ Ht for any t ≥ 0. Then H∞ is the set of all possible histories in this
infinite-horizon game.8 Hereafter, H∞ is endowed with the product topology.
For each player i ∈ I, the payoff function ui is a bounded continuous function
from H∞ to R. Moreover, we assume that payoff functions satisfy the “continuity
at infinity” condition9: for each T ≥ 1, let
wT = sup
i∈I
(x,s)∈H∞
(x,s)∈H∞
xT−1=xT−1
sT−1=sT−1
|ui(x, s)− ui(x, s)|. (1)
Then a dynamic game is said to be “continuous at infinity” if wT → 0 as T →∞.
This condition is standard and is widely used in dynamic games. It is obvious to
see that every finite game and every game with discounting satisfy this condition.
2.2 Strategies and subgame-perfect equilibria
A mixed strategy for a player i ∈ I should specify, for all t ≥ 1 and all ht−1 ∈ Ht−1,
the mixed action that the player i will use at stage t when the prior history of the
game is ht−1. Below is the formal definition:
7A correspondence is said to be continuous if it is both upper hemicontinuous and lower
hemicontinuous. For more details, see Hildenbrand (1974).
8A finite horizon dynamic game can be regarded as a special case of an infinite horizon dynamic
game in the sense that the action correspondence Ati is point-valued for each player i ∈ I and t ≥ T for
some stage T ≥ 1; see, for example, Bo¨rgers (1989), Harris, Reny and Robson (1995), and He and Sun
(2019).
9see Fudenberg and Levine (1983) and He and Sun (2019).
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Definition 1. For player i ∈ I, a mixed strategy fi is a sequence {fti}t≥1 such
that fti is a Borel measurable mapping from Ht−1 to M(Xti) and
support (fti(·|ht−1)) ⊂ Ati(ht−1)10
for all t ≥ 1 and ht−1 ∈ Ht−1. A strategy profile f = {fi}i∈I is a combination of
strategies of all active players.
In any subgame, a strategy profile induces a probability distribution over the
set of histories. This probability distribution is called the path induced by the
strategy profile in the subgame. Before describing how a strategy combination
induces a path in Definition 2, we need to define some technical terms. Given a
strategy profile f = {fi}i∈I , denote ⊗i∈I0f(t′+1)i as a transition probability from
the set of histories Ht′ to M(Xt′+1). For the notational simplicity later on, we
assume that ⊗i∈I0f(t′+1)i(·|ht′) represents the strategy profile in stage t′ + 1 for a
given history ht′ ∈ Ht′ , where ⊗i∈I0f(t′+1)i(·|ht′) is the product of the probability
measures f(t′+1)i(·|ht′), i ∈ I0. If λ is a finite measure on X and ν is a transition
probability from X to Y , then λν is a measure on X×Y such that λν(A×B) =∫
A ν(B|x)λ(dx) for any measurable subsets A ⊆ X and B ⊆ Y .
Definition 2. Suppose that a strategy profile f = {fi}i∈I and a history ht ∈ Ht are
given for some t ≥ 0. Let τt = δht, where δht is the probability measure concentrated
at the point ht. If τt′ ∈M(Ht′) has already been defined for some t′ ≥ t, then let
τt′+1 = τt′  (⊗i∈I0f(t′+1)i).
Finally, let τ ∈ M(H∞) be the unique probability measure on H∞ such that
MargHt′ τ = τt′ for all t
′ ≥ t. Then τ is called the path induced by f in the
subgame ht. For all i ∈ I,
∫
H∞ ui dτ is the payoff of player i in this subgame.
We are now ready to give the notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium. It requires
that each player’s strategy should be optimal in every subgame.
Definition 3 (SPE). A subgame-perfect equilibrium is a strategy profile f such
that for all i ∈ I, t ≥ 0, and all ht ∈ Ht, player i cannot improve his payoff in the
subgame beginning at ht by a unilateral change in his strategy.
Definition 4 (weak no-mixing property). A mixed-strategy subgame-perfect equi-
librium f is said to have the weak no-mixing property if there exists a pure-strategy
subgame-perfect equilibrium g, such that
gti(ht−1) ∈ support (fti(·|ht−1))
10If µ is a probability measure on a polish space X, then support (µ) denotes the smallest closed
subset C of X such that µ(C) = 1.
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for all t ≥ 1, i ∈ I, and all ht−1 ∈ Ht−1.
Definition 5 (no-mixing property). A mixed-strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium
f is said to have the no-mixing property if for any pure-strategy profile g which
satisfies:
gti(ht−1) ∈ support (fti(·|ht−1))
for all t ≥ 1, i ∈ I, and all ht−1 ∈ Ht−1, then g is a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
3 An example
In this section, we present an example in which a player can get higher payoff by
using mixed strategies. The game G1 is shown in Figure 1:
Figure 1: The game G1.
In this game, it is easy to see that player 1’s SPE payoff is less than or equal
to 1 if both players are restricted to pure strategies: otherwise, player 1’s payoff
must be 4, and we can see that SPE paths are L1 → L2 → L3 and R1 → R2 → R3.
However, player 2 will deviate in both paths. Then we consider the following
mixed strategy profile: player 1 chooses 0.5L1 + 0.5R1; player 2 always chooses
0.5L2 + 0.5R2; player 3 always chooses 0.5L3 + 0.5R3. It is easy to check that this
mixed strategy profile is a subgame-perfect equilibrium, and player 1’s expected
payoff is 1.5, which is greater than the maximal payoff by playing pure strategy.
4 Dynamic zero-sum games
The example in Section 3 shows that a player may benefit from mixed strategies
in a general dynamic game. In contrast, in this section we focus on the most
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classical game: two-player zero-sum games with perfect information (with or
without Nature), and we show a novel result in Section 4.1: every mixed strategy
subgame-perfect equilibrium has the no-mixing property. This result also has many
applications: in Section 4.2 we prove the existence of pure strategy subgame-
perfect equilibrium in zero-sum games with Nature. In Section 4.3 we propose an
improved backward induction algorithm based on the main result and we discuss
some applications.
4.1 The main result
The main result in this section is as follows.
Theorem 1. If G is a two-player dynamic zero-sum (or fixed sum) game with
perfect information (with or without Nature), then each mixed-strategy subgame-
perfect equilibrium f = {f1, f2} has the no-mixing property.
Proof of Theorem 1. Given any history ht−1, let f |ht−1 denote the continuation
strategy profile in the subgame beginning at ht−1, and let ui(f |ht−1) denote the
continuation payoff for player i in the subgame. Suppose g = {g1, g2} is a pure-
strategy profile that satisfies:
gti(ht−1) ∈ support (fti(·|ht−1))
for all t ≥ 1, i ∈ I, and all ht−1 ∈ Ht−1, then we need to show that g is a
subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Fix an arbitrary history ht−1 where Nature is not the mover at ht−1, and we
focus on the subgame beginning from ht−1, without lose of generality, we can
assume player 1 is the only mover at ht−1. Let f
ht−1
1 denote the strategy for player
1 that coincides with f1 at all histories except for ht−1 where it plays according to
g1. For player 2, let f
ht−1
2 = f2. Below we can show that:
u1(f
ht−1
1 , f
ht−1
2 |ht−1) = u1(f |ht−1)
For each action a ∈ At1(ht−1), let u¯1(f |ht−1, a) denote the expected payoff for
player 1 at the subgame follows ht−1 if he chooses a at ht−1 and then plays according
to f1. Therefore, we have the following results:
u1(f
ht−1
1 , f
ht−1
2 |ht−1) = u¯1(f |ht−1, gt1(ht−1))
u1(f |ht−1) =
∫
At1(ht−1)
u¯1(f |ht−1, a)ft1(da|ht−1)
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Since f = (f1, f2) is a subgame-perfect equilibrium, we can easily see that:
u1(f |ht−1) ≥ u1(fht−11 , fht−12 |ht−1)
If the equality does not hold, then we can derive that:∫
At1(ht−1)
u¯1(f |ht−1, a)ft1(da|ht−1) > u¯1(f |ht−1, gt1(ht−1))
since the payoff function u¯1(f |ht−1, a) is continuous on a, so from the above
inequality there exists an open neighborhood O such that each action in O
is not a best response for player 1, and this leads to a contradiction: since
gt1(ht−1) ∈ support (ft1(·|ht−1)), hence instead of playing gt1 at ht−1, player 1
can increase his payoff by transferring the probability in O (which is a positive
number) to the set of best response. Therefore, u1(f
ht−1
1 , f
ht−1
2 |ht−1) = u1(f |ht−1).
In addition, since the game is zero-sum (or fixed sum), we also have:
u2(f
ht−1
1 , f
ht−1
2 |ht−1) = u2(f |ht−1).
Now we consider the history ht = (ht−1, gt1(ht−1)), and use the same argument
as above:
• If player 1 is the only mover at ht, then define fht1 as the strategy for player 1
that coincides with f
ht−1
1 at all histories except for ht where it plays according
to g1. Let f
ht
2 = f
ht−1
2 . Then we can conclude that:
ui(f
ht
1 , f
ht
2 |ht) = ui(fht−1 |ht) for i = 1, 2;
and hence also have:
ui(f
ht
1 , f
ht
2 |ht−1) = ui(f |ht−1) for i = 1, 2.
• If player 2 is the only mover at ht, then define fht2 as the strategy for player 2
that coincides with f
ht−1
2 at all histories except for ht where it plays according
to g2. Let f
ht
1 = f
ht−1
1 . Then we can conclude that:
ui(f
ht
1 , f
ht
2 |ht) = ui(fht−1 |ht) for i = 1, 2;
and hence also have:
ui(f
ht
1 , f
ht
2 |ht−1) = ui(f |ht−1) for i = 1, 2.
• If the Nature is the only mover at ht, then let fht1 = fht−11 and fht2 = fht−12 ,
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and obviously,
ui(f
ht
1 , f
ht
2 |ht−1) = ui(f |ht−1) for i = 1, 2.
Keep using this forward induction argument, we can obtain a sequence of strategy
profile {fhT1 , fhT2 }T≥t−1 that satisfies:
ui(f
hT
1 , f
hT
2 |ht−1) = ui(f |ht−1) for i = 1, 2 and any T ≥ t− 1
By the construction of fhTi and since ui is continuous at infinity, we can see that
lim
T→∞
ui(f
hT
1 , f
hT
2 |ht−1) = ui(g|ht−1) for i = 1, 2.
Thus, we conclude that
ui(f |ht−1) = ui(g|ht−1) for i = 1, 2.
Now we are ready to prove that g = {g1, g2} is a pure SPE. Fix any history
ht−1 ∈ Ht−1 and assume player 1 is the mover at ht−1. Since the game is continuous
at infinity, so we only need to show that player 1 cannot improve his payoff in
the subgame follows ht−1 by a one-stage deviation at ht−1: for any action a ∈
At1(ht−1), combined with the above result and we have that:
u1(g1, g2|ht−1) = u1(f1, f2|ht−1)
≥ u1(f1, f2|ht−1, a)
= u1(g1, g2|ht−1, a)
The first and the second equality is from the above result, and the inequality is
due to the fact that f is a SPE. This implies that g = {g1, g2} is not improvable
by any one-stage deviation and hence is a pure SPE.
As a direct application of this theorem, we can answer the question proposed at
the beginning of this paper: does randomization help in a chess play? Now based
on our theorem, we can see the answer is that randomization is useless in a chess
play: because for any mixed SPE in mixed form, we can always get a pure SPE
after realization of uncertainty. We also notice that most papers on chess play only
consider pure SPE, for example, Zermelo (1913), Schwalbe and Walker (2001), and
Ewerhart (2000, 2002). Therefore, this theorem implies that we can focus on pure
SPE when studying a zero-sum game including chess play. Apart from this direct
application, our theorem has many other interesting applications and we discuss
them in the following subsections.
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Below we shall present an example to show that a SPE may not have the (weak)
no-mixing property in a two-player dynamic game without zero-sum condition. The
game G2 is shown in Figure 2:
Figure 2: The game G2.
Firstly, we can find a mixed-strategy SPE by using the backward induction. In
the last stage, player 2 is indifferent between L4 and R4, hence player 2 can choose
a mixed strategy 0.5L4 + 0.5R4 at this stage and it induces the expected payoff
(−2, 4) for two players. In the third stage, since player 1 is indifferent between L3
and R4, hence player 1 can also choose a mixed strategy 0.5L3+0.5R3 at this stage
and it induces the expected payoff (−2, 2) for two players. Similarly, in the second
stage, player 2 can use a mixed strategy 0.5L2 + 0.5R2 which induces the expected
payoff (1.5, 2). Finally at stage 1, player 1 has to choose L1. Thus, we obtain a
mixed-strategy SPE f = (L1, 0.5L3 + 0.5R3; 0.5L2 + 0.5R2, 0.5L4 + 0.5R4).
However, this SPE f does not have the weak no-mixing property, below we use
the forward induction to derive this conclusion: suppose g is a pure SPE such that
g(ht) ∈ support f(ht) for every history ht, so player 1 has to choose L1 in stage
1. Then in stage 2, player 2 must choose L2, otherwise player will deviate to R1
at stage 1 to improve his payoff. In stage 3, player 1 must choose R3 to make
sure that player 2 will not deviate at stage2. Finally at the last stage, if player
1 chooses L4, then player 1 at stage 1 will deviate; if player 2 chooses R4, then
player 1 at the third stage will also deviate. Hence we derive a contradiction.
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4.2 The existence of pure-strategy subgame-perfect
equilibria
The existence of pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium in a dynamic game
with perfect information has been a fundamental problem since Zermelo (1913).
A well known result is that the subgame-perfect equilibrium can be obtained
by using backward induction in finite games with perfect information. The
generalization of this result has been considered by many authors. For example, for
perfect information games without Nature, the existence of pure-strategy subgame-
perfect equilibrium was shown in Bo¨rgers (1989, 1991), Harris (1985), Hellwig
and Leininger (1987), and Hellwig et al. (1990). However, for perfect information
games with the Nature, a pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium need not exist
as shown by a four-stage game in Harris, Reny and Robson (1995). Moreover,
the nonexistence of a mixed-strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium in a five-stage
game with Nature was shown by Luttmer and Mariotti (2003). Thus, we need
to find some general conditions to guarantee the existence of subgame-perfect
equilibrium in perfect information games with Nature. Recently, He and Sun
(2019) proved that if Nature’s move is an atomless probability measure in any
stage it moves (atomless transitions), then there exists a pure-strategy subgame-
perfect equilibrium. In this subsection, we show that for any two-player zero-sum
game with perfect information (with or without Nature), there always exists a
pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium. Compared with He and Sun (2019),
we do not require the Nature to satisfy the atomless transitions.
Proposition 1. If G is a two-player zero-sum game with perfect information (with
or without Nature), then it possesses a pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Proof. The Proposition 39 in Harris, Reny and Robson (1995) shows that, for each
two-player zero-sum game with (almost) perfect information, there exists a mixed
subgame-perfect equilibrium f , then combined with Theorem 1, each no-mixing
purification of f is a pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium.
This Proposition generalizes Harris, Reny and Robson (1995)’s result for perfect
information games, and the proof is very concise by using Theorem 1. Proposition 1
will not hold without the zero-sum condition: Harris, Reny and Robson (1995) gave
an example that has three players. Below we give an example with two players.
Consider the following five-stage game. In stage 1, player 1 chooses a1 ∈ [0, 1].
In stage 2, player 2 chooses a2 ∈ [0, 1]. In stage 3, Nature chooses some x ∈
[−a1 − a2, a1 + a2] based on the uniform distribution. After stage 3, player 1
and player 2 move sequentially. The subgame follows a history (a1, a2, a3) and
associated payoffs are shown in Figure 3
13
Figure 3: The subgame (a1, a2, a3).
This game does not possess a pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium: in
the subgame (a1, a2, a3), it is easy to see that the SPE path is (R1, R2) if a3 > 0;
and the SPE path is (L1, R2) if a3 < 0. Therefore, if a1 + a2 > 0, the expected
payoff for player 1 and player 2 will be (1− a1, 1− a2). Otherwise, if a1 + a2 = 0,
which means a1 = a2 = a3 = 0, then the SPE payoff for players 1 and 2 will be
(0, 0) or (2, 0) or (0, 2). Hence we can see the contradiction: if a player i chooses
a positive action in equilibrium, then his payoff is (1 − ai), and he can improve
his payoff by choosing a smaller number. Thus the only possible case is that both
players choose 0, however, one player gets payoff 0 and hence will deviate to a
small positive number.
4.3 Universal subgame-perfect equilibria
In this subsection, we discuss another application of the Theorem 1. According
to Theorem 1, given any mixed subgame-perfect equilibrium, we know that each
realization of this equilibrium is a pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Therefore, it is natural to consider that whether there exists a mixed subgame-
perfect equilibrium whose realizations are all the pure-strategy subgame-perfect
equilibrium. Such subgame-perfect equilibrium is called a universal subgame-
perfect equilibrium. We show that there exists a universal subgame-perfect
equilibrium in two-player zero-sum games, and we propose an improved backward
induction algorithm to find it. Some examples are also discussed.
Firstly, we describe this algorithm: it is almost the same as the usual backward
induction, the only difference is when we encounter multiple optimal choices in
some stage: the usual backward induction chooses an arbitrary optimal choice;
But in our improved algorithm, we use a mixed strategy such that the support of
this strategy coincides with the set of optimal choices.
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Now we show that for two-player zero-sum games, the improved backward
induction algorithm generates a subgame-perfect equilibrium that “contains” all
the pure subgame-perfect equilibrium. The following proposition is the main result
and we only consider finite-horizon games in this subsection.
Proposition 2. Given a two-player zero-sum (or fixed sum) game with perfect
information, suppose f is a mixed subgame-perfect equilibrium constructed by the
improved backward induction algorithm. Then all the realizations of f constitute
the set of all the pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Proof. From Theorem 1 we know that each realization of f is a pure-strategy
subgame-perfect equilibrium, hence we only need to show that for each pure-
strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium g, we have:
gti(ht−1) ∈ support (fti(·|ht−1))
for all t ≥ 1, i ∈ I, and all ht−1 ∈ Ht−1. Consider the subgame beginning at ht−1
and assume player i is the only mover at this stage. It is well known that every two
subgame-perfect equilibria generate the same payoffs for two players in a zero-sum
game. Therefore,
ui(g|ht−1) = ui(g|ht−1, gti(ht−1)) = ui(f |ht−1, gti(ht−1)).
Then if gti(ht−1) /∈ support (fti(·|ht−1)), due to the construction of f we can see
that there exists an action a ∈ Ati(ht−1) such that
ui(f |ht−1, gti(ht−1)) < ui(f |ht−1, a) = ui(g|ht−1, a),
which implies:
ui(g|ht−1) < ui(g|ht−1, a),
this contradicts to that g is a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
It is worth noting that zero-sum is a necessary condition in this proposition:
consider the example in Section 3, we obtained a mixed subgame-perfect equi-
librium by using the improved backward induction, however, there is no pure-
strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium in the realizations of that mixed subgame-
perfect equilibrium. Proposition 2 shows that in order to find all the pure-strategy
subgame-perfect equilibria, we only need to use the improved backward induction,
hence it is much faster than just using the usual backward induction. Below we
provide two examples.
• Tian Ji’s horse racing strategy: This is an ancient Chinese story based
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on game theory. The story goes like this: Tian Ji is a high-ranking army
commander in the country Qi. He likes to play horse racing with the king of
the country and they often make bets. Tian Ji and the king both have three
horses in different classes, namely, good, better and best. Of course, the king
has slightly more superior horse in all three levels. The rule of the race is
that there are three rounds; each of the horses must be used in one round,
and the winner is the one who wins at least two rounds. In each round, the
king chooses a horse first, Tian Ji observes the king’s choice, then he makes
his own choice. In the story, both of them use their “good” horse against the
opponent’s “good” horse, “better” against the “better”, and “best” against
the “best”. So Tian Ji loses all the time. Tian Ji is unhappy about that until
he meets Sun Bin, one of the most famous generals in Chinese history. Sun
Bin brings up an idea: he uses Tian Ji’s “good” horse for racing the king’s
“best” horse, then uses the “best” one against the king’s “better” one, and the
“better” one against the “good” one. As a result, Tian Ji loses the first round,
but wins the second and the third round (because his “best” and “better”
horse can still beat the king’s “better” and “good” ones respectively), and
eventually wins the race.
Now we can formulate this story as a dynamic game and it can be
characterized by the following game tree (player 1 is the king, and player
2 is Tian Ji; let A, B, C denote “best”, “better” and “good” horses,
respectively):11
Figure 4: The game G4.
Although the game tree is very complicated, we can easily find all the
pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium by using our improved backward
11This game should be a six-stage game, but in this game tree we omit the last two stages because
each player has only one action at the last two stages.
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induction algorithm: below we just list all the SPE paths:
A→ C → B → A→ C → B;
A→ C → C → B → B → A;
B → A→ A→ C → C → B;
B → A→ C → B → A→ C;
C → B → A→ C → B → A;
C → B → B → A→ A→ C.
The first path is the one used in the story and we can see that all the six
paths generate payoff (−1, 1), which implies that player 2 (Tian Ji) always
has the wining strategy!
• A variation of the bargaining model: Two players are trying to allocate
one dollar between. In stage 1, player 1 makes an offer (x1, 1 − x1), then in
stage 2, player 2 accepts or rejects the offer. If the offer is accepted, then
the game is over and the players receive (x1, 1 − x1). Otherwise the game
continuous to the stage 3, where player 2 makes an offer (1 − x2, x2), then
in stage 4, player 1 accepts or rejects the offer. If the offer is accepted, then
the game is over and the players receive (1 − x2, x2). Otherwise the game
continuous to the last stage where Nature determines the payoff for player 1
based on a uniform distribution over [0, 1].
This is a fixed sum game with infinitely many actions and Nature is a (passive)
player. By using our improved backward induction algorithm, we obtain a
mixed subgame-perfect equilibrium f : in stage 1, f11 is a uniform distribution
over [12 , 1]; in stage 2, f22 equals “accept” only if x1 <
1
2 ; in stage 3, f32 is
a uniform distribution over [12 , 1]; in stage 4, f41 equals “accept” only if
x2 <
1
2 . According to Proposition 2, this mixed subgame-perfect equilibrium
will generate all the pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium.
5 Multi-player games
In this section, we try to generalize the Theorem 1 to games with multiple players.
The condition of zero-sum (fixed sum) is not enough to guarantee the (weak) no-
mixing property, to see a counter example, we consider a fix sum game G4 as shown
in the following figure 5:
Firstly, notice that the strategy profile f = (L1; 0.5L2+0.5R2; 0.5L3+0.5R3) is a
17
Figure 5: The game G5.
mixed subgame-perfect equilibrium, however, there is not pure-strategy subgame-
perfect equilibrium which is in the support(f). We prove this fact by forward
induction: if g is a pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium that is in the
support(f), then player 1 must choose L1 in the first stage. Thus in the second
stage, player 2 has to choose L2, otherwise player 1 will deviate at stage 1. Then
we derive a contradiction: if player 3 chooses L3, then player 2 will deviate to R2;
if player 3 chooses R3, then player 1 will deviate to R1.
This counter example suggests that we need some other condition to guarantee
the no-mixing property for multi-player dynamic game with perfect information.
Now we show that if the game satisfies the no indifference condition, which was
introduced by Osborne and Rubinstein (1994, Exercise 100.2).
Definition 6. A dynamic game with perfect information satisfies the no indiffer-
ence condition if for any two histories h∞, h′∞ ∈ H∞, if
ui(h∞) = ui(h′∞)
for some player i ∈ I, then uj(h∞) = uj(h′∞) for every j ∈ I.
Using this definition, we are now ready to show the main result in this section
as follows:
Theorem 2. If G is a finite-horizon dynamic game with perfect information
(without Nature), then each mixed-strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium f =
{f1, ..., fn} has the no-mixing property.
Proof of Theorem 2. This proof is different from the proof of Theorem 1, now we
need to use the backward induction to prove this result. Suppose g = {g1, ..., gn}
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is a pure-strategy profile that satisfies:
gti(ht−1) ∈ support (fti(·|ht−1))
for all t ≥ 1, i ∈ I, and all ht−1 ∈ Ht−1, then we need to show that g is a pure-
strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium. Suppose the game G has T stages, and we
begin with the last stage. Consider any subgame in the last stage beginning with
some history hT−1 and assume player i is the only mover in that stage, first we
show that gT i(hT−1) is an optimal choice for player i in this subgame. Otherwise,
there must exist an action a ∈ AT i(hT−1), such that
ui(hT−1, a) > ui(hT−1, gT i(hT−1)),
since ui is a continuous function, there exists an open neighborhood O of gT i(hT−1)
such that
ui(hT−1, a) > ui(hT−1, b),
for any b ∈ O. Since gTi(hT−1) ∈ support (fT i(·|hT−1)), hence fT i(O|hT−1) > 0
and player i can improve his payoff by transferring this positive probability to the
set of optimal choices, contradicting to that f is a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Thus, gT i(hT−1) is an optimal choice for player i in the subgame follows hT−1 and
we have
ui(g|hT−1) = ui(hT−1, gT i(hT−1)) = ui(f |hT−1).
Let B denote the set support(fT i), from the above argument we can see that for
each b ∈ B, we have ui(hT−1, b) = ui(f |hT−1) = ui(hT−1, gT i(hT−1)). Since the
game G satisfies the no indifference condition, we conclude that
uj(hT−1, b) = uj(hT−1, gT i(hT−1))
for every j ∈ I. Therefore, we have that:
uj(hT−1, gT i(hT−1)) =
∫
B
uj(hT−1, b)fT i(db|hT−1) = ui(f |hT−1),
and hence uj(g|hT−1) = uj(f |hT−1) for every j ∈ I.
Now we construct a game G′ with T −1 stages: G′ is the same as G for the first
T −1 stages, and for each terminal history hT−1 in game G′, the payoff u′i(hT−1) =
ui(hT−1, gT i(hT−1)), hence the game G′ also satisfies the no indifference condition,
and f is still a subgame-perfect equilibrium in G′ because uj(g|hT−1) = uj(f |hT−1)
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for every j ∈ I. By using the same argument as above we conclude that:
u′j(g|hT−2) = u′j(f |hT−2),
for each history hT−2 and every player j ∈ I. According to the definition of u′j we
have that:
uj(g|hT−2) = u′j(f |hT−2) = ui(f |hT−2).
Keeping using this backward induction argument, we conclude that:
uj(g|ht−1) = uj(f |ht−1)
for every 1 ≤ t ≤ T and every player j ∈ I. Now we are ready to prove that g
is a pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium. Fix any history ht−1 ∈ Ht−1 and
assume player i is the mover at ht−1. Since the game has finite stages, hence we
only need to show that player i cannot improve his payoff in the subgame follows
ht−1 by a one-stage deviation at ht−1: for any action a ∈ Ati(ht−1), combined with
the above result and we have that:
ui(g|ht−1) = ui(f |ht−1)
≥ ui(f |ht−1, a)
= ui(g|ht−1, a)
The first and the second equality is from the above result, and the inequality
is due to the fact that f is a subgame-perfect equilibrium. This implies that
g = {g1, ..., gn} is not improvable by any one-stage deviation and hence is a pure-
strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium.
This proof is easier than the proof of Theorem 1 because we only consider finite
horizon games without Nature, but these two restrictions cannot be removed. If
Nature is also a (passive) player in the game, we can revise the game G1 in Section 3
to obtain a game G′1: in stage 1, we change the payoffs for L1 to (2, 3); at the last
stage, let Nature be a player after L4 with two actions L5, R5, and the payoffs
are (8, 1) for L5, (4, 7) for R5. Nature’s strategy is 0.5L5 + 0.5R5. Obviously
this game satisfies the no indifference condition. Then similar to the analysis in
Section 3, we can show that the mixed strategy profile f constructed in Section 3
is also a subgame-perfect equilibrium but it does not have the no-mixing property.
Theorem 2 cannot be generalized to games with infinite horizons, we present a
counter example in the Appendix.
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6 Discussion
Theorem 1 shows that for any two-player game with perfect information, the zero-
sum condition guarantees that each subgame-perfect equilibrium has the no-mixing
property. The example in Section 3 indicates that this does not hold for general non
zero-sum games. Theorem 2 extends the main result to multi-player games under
the condition of no indifference. It can be shown that the game has a unique pure-
strategy SPE payoff for each player if the game satisfies zero-sum or no indifference
condition. Therefore, it is natural to consider whether we can generalize the main
result to a general game with a unique pure-strategy SPE payoff. However, this
generalization is incorrect: see the game G6 below.
Figure 6: The game G6.
In this game, if player 2 chooses L2 then the game goes to G1, which is the
game in Section 3. Based on the analysis in Section 3, we can see that the game
G5 has only one pure-strategy SPE payoff: (6, 4). Then we consider a mixed
strategy profile g = (R1; 0.5L2 + 0.5R2; f), where f is the mixed SPE for game G1
constructed in Section 3. It is easy to verify that g is a subgame-perfect equilibrium,
however, there is no pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium in the support(g),
which means g does not have the no-mixing property.
7 Appendix
In the proof of Theorem 2, we mentioned that the result cannot be generalized to
infinite-horizon games. Here we present an infinite-horizon game that satisfies the
no indifference condition, but has a subgame-perfect equilibrium failing to have
the no-mixing property. See the game G7 in Figure 7 below:
Obviously, this game satisfies the no indifference condition. It is easy to verify
that the following strategy profile is a SPE: both players keeping using 0.5L+0.5R
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Figure 7: The game G7.
at every node. However, this SPE does not have no-mixing property: if player 1
chooses L at stage 1, then player 2 cannot choose L at the second stage..
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